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other men simultaneously are looking at. He does not seem to recognize that this belief is based on the very dualism he deprecates as unphilosophical. The observer regards the sun he sees as identical with that his fellows see because he inevitably regards the sun, not as a factor existing in combination with his own ego, and only so constituting the real, but just as a 'thing' apart from himself. A very unsophisticated and uncritical opinion no doubt, but just so soon as the idealistic philosopher shall convince him that his experience is just subject *plus* object, each term existing only in relation to the other, must he be logically forced to admit that his assumption of an object common to himself and others was unwarranted—the sun he sees will no longer be 'the same' as the sun others see. It seems impossible by any mere analysis of the data of individual knowledge to reach a conception of reality wider than the circle of individual experience. The monad, in Leibniz's well-known phrase, has no windows.

If space permitted, it would be interesting to examine Dr. Ward's teleology. He is bolder than most modern idealists and rejects the notion of a teleological theory that shall be consistent with, though in some sort, transcending, a mechanical view of the natural world. He will make no terms with the enemy, and declares the two systems to be wholly incompatible. It would, however, have been welcome to his readers if he had shown more fully and clearly in what way he conceives purpose and reason to be present in the universe. Whether it is a theistic or a pantheistic theology to which his philosophy offers support, is left in doubt. So also there seems to be a deliberate vagueness in regard to the 'freedom' which his spiritualism implies. He admits that by his system "contingency is let into the very heart of things," but "the contingency is not that of chance but of freedom, as far as everything that is is a law to itself, has an end for itself, and seeks the good." Surely, when no justification is offered for the use of terms so purely anthropomorphic as 'law,' 'end' and 'good' in what professes to be an ontological system, such a sentence comes dangerously near to sound without sense. And it is for such "airy nothings" that we are asked to abandon the conception of nature that guided Descartes and Leibniz, Darwin and Kelvin and Helmholtz.

E. RITCHIE.

*Jean Jacques Rousseau's Socialphilosophie.* Von FRANZ HAYMANN. Leipzig, Veit & Co., 1899.—pp. x, 403.

In the July number of this REVIEW there is an article on Rousseau, in which I have referred to two recent works on the great Swiss

writer—one English, the other a French work in an English translation. Since that article appeared, a German work with the above title has come into my hands. The work, consisting of more than four hundred octavo pages, is a pretty formidable production for such a limited subject ; and it may be questioned whether it might not have been condensed without any serious loss of perspicuity. At the same time, it is but fair to say that the book has all the thoroughness characteristic of the best literary work of Germany, and that the expansion of the book is due partly to the necessity of copious quotation to vindicate the author's interpretation of Rousseau. Very properly, he is not content with mere references which the reader might turn up for himself, but gives in full the passages on which his interpretation is based.

As justification of his work the author seems to plead three reasons. One is that most criticisms of Rousseau's social philosophy have been obscured by association with alleged influences in Rousseau's own life, or with alleged effects in the history of France ; and it is important therefore that this philosophical system should be estimated on its own merits. Another reason is the fact that, while Rousseau's educational theory is fully expounded in *Emile*, his social philosophy is not given in any one work, but has to be gathered from a number of independent and sometimes fragmentary treatises. Haymann complains, perhaps with justice, that hitherto in general Rousseau's social philosophy has been drawn almost exclusively from his sole systematic treatise on the subject, the *Contrat Social*. He has therefore made a careful study of the less familiar writings of Rousseau, which deal with social or political subjects, and he has also drawn upon manuscript remains of the philosopher, which have only within recent years been given to the world. Of these the most important for his purpose are contained in the edition of the *Contrat Social* by Edmund Dreyfus-Brisac, which was published three years ago, and gives, along with the definitive text, the earlier versions collated with the autograph manuscripts preserved at Geneva and Neuchatel.

But a third, and probably the principal justification of Haymann's work, is evidently the fact that he believes Rousseau's social theories to have been in general misinterpreted. The main object of his book, therefore, may be said to be the correction of this misinterpretation. The common interpretation, however, is, on his own acknowledgment, by no means unintelligible. In fact, he frankly admits his new reading of Rousseau "not only comes into conflict, on many important points, with the prevalent conception of Rousseau's teaching, but it offers, on

the first view at all events, a totally different picture from the immediate impression which the writings of Rousseau, that bear upon the subject, are wont to produce on his readers (pp. 337, 338).

There is therefore an acknowledged difficulty in arriving at Rousseau's real doctrines. That difficulty arises partly from the want of any kind of unity in the external form of his treatment. But it is also evident that it is not always easy, if it is even possible, to find a logical harmony between his different doctrines, these having obviously been modified from time to time, even if he did not hold at one and the same time doctrines which are mutually inconsistent. We are therefore, as Haymann puts it in his preface (p. vii), driven to one or other of the two alternatives: "either that Rousseau was a wrong-headed fool who had the audacity to conjoin the most incompatible elements in his teaching, or that the correct interpretation of his social theory has long been most fatally missed in extensive circles of readers." Now, Haymann pleads with justice, it is an unscientific, superficially empirical treatment of history, which would rest at the mere fact of such doctrines being in apparent conflict, without seeking to find some harmonizing logical concept by which their connection may be explained. Accordingly, he endeavors to expound the logical harmony of Rousseau's social theories. His work is divided into ten sections, which treat respectively (1) of the exact problem at issue, (2) of the *droit naturel*, (3) of the *contrat social* in the abstract, (4) of the *volonté générale*, (5) of the sovereignty of the people, (6) of the *contrat social* in its relation to social experience, (7) of the idea of contract in Rousseau's social philosophy, (8) of criminal and constitutional law, (9) of Rousseau's politics, while the closing section gives a critique of Rousseau's social philosophy.

In the first or introductory section, Haymann begins by quoting Schlosser's *Weltgeschichte* as expressing the common misunderstanding with regard to Rousseau. It may be observed that in the second volume of his *Geschichte des 18ten Jahrhunderts*, Schlosser gives a much more elaborate account of Rousseau, of his writings and his influence. It would perhaps have been fairer to Schlosser, therefore, to take this rather than the comparatively brief account in the *Weltgeschichte* as expressing his critical estimate of Rousseau; and certainly in the longer account exceedingly little stress is laid on the point to which Haymann refers. Still it may be acknowledged that the theory of a social contract, connected most prominently with the name of Rousseau, has been commonly interpreted as implying that such a contract was the actual historical origin of civil society. How far the expositors of

the theory are responsible for such an interpretation it is unnecessary to inquire. Such an interpretation has undoubtedly been prevalent. Among the English contemporaries of Rousseau, for example, by whom the theory is combatted, Paley may be noticed as devoting a considerable part of his critique to an exposure of the groundlessness of this historical assumption. Haymann has therefore done a valuable service in pointing out that no hypothesis about the actual origin of society forms any integral part of Rousseau's teaching. There are, in this connection, four facts which Haymann seems to have made out by sufficient evidence: (1) Rousseau does not deal with the historical or empirical origin of existing societies; (2) when he touches on the subject, he appears to hold that they originated in force rather than in convention; (3) he does not admit that convention could in all cases create a rightful social order; (4) he does not regard right as a mere creature of convention, but on the contrary maintains that convention presupposes right—that, in fact, a people must be a people, and not a mere aggregation of individuals, before it can form a convention. The “cardinal problem of Rousseau's social philosophy” is, therefore, “to discover the fundamental conditions under which a social order with irrefragable obligation becomes possible” (p. 9).

To solve this problem the author seeks, in the second section, to find Rousseau's definition of *droit naturel*. The basis of natural right on Rousseau's theory he finds in a passage, to which I have drawn special attention in my article of last July. It occurs in the preface to the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*. It is the passage in which Rousseau recognizes the two impulses of self-love and sympathy as the most elementary facts of the human soul. These form, as Haymann observes, what we are now accustomed to speak of as the egoistic and the altruistic instincts of human nature. Now, without discussing the adequacy of Rousseau's psychology, there are two points which may fairly be disputed. The first is, whether the primary natural right—the right of liberty—is logically involved in these natural instincts. Certainly Rousseau does not give such a satisfactory ‘deduction’ of this primary right as is given, *e. g.*, by Kant and the philosophers of the Kantian movement in general, or by representatives of modern empirical evolutionism, like Herbert Spencer. This point is perhaps logically connected with another, which Haymann overlooks, and to which attention is drawn in my July article. The two principles in question are described by Rousseau as being “anterior to reason”; and consequently the fundamental ideas of morality and law are traced by him, not to a rational foundation, but to instincts of sen-

sibility. In this respect the ethical and political philosophy of Rousseau seems to be decidedly inferior to that of Hobbes, who, while recognizing a certain basis for morality and law in natural inclination, yet gives greater prominence to the natural dictates of reason.

As liberty is thus made the primitive right of man, the third section proceeds to show how Rousseau proposes to secure this right. As Haymann proves by ample quotation, Rousseau sees clearly that liberty is not to be confounded with license, which is rather slavery to the passion of the moment. "Liberty is obedience to a law which one prescribes for oneself" (*Con. Soc.*, I, 8). Haymann does not appear to see that this is an abandonment by Rousseau of his own teaching. For this implies that the primary right of liberty rests, not on any non rational impulse of nature, but on rational law, on the laws which reason prescribes for the control of natural impulse. But liberty is thus found by Rousseau, as it was afterwards by Kant, in practical reason, in the self-legislation or the autonomy of the will. The problem of political philosophy thus comes to be "to find a form of society in which every individual, uniting himself with all, still obeys only himself, and remains as free as before" (*Con. Soc.*, I, 6). How is such a society to be formed? Only by mutual contract among the members. Only such a contract can secure for all their natural right of liberty.

In the formation of a social contract, as the next two sections explain at length, the consent of all the members is implied, and therefore it is necessary to define what general consent or the general will (*volonté générale*) really is. It does not appear to me that Rousseau's statements on the subject are always consistent; but their tendency seems to be to define the general will by reference rather to its object than to the number of persons whose consent is involved. It does not mean the will of the majority, nor even the will of all the members of a community. Rousseau explicitly distinguishes *volonté générale* from *volonté de tous* (*Con. Soc.*, II, 3). The general will seems to be understood to mean the will which seeks the general good, which is concerned with the citizen as citizen, with men as men; and, in another dim foreshadowing of Kantian doctrines, virtue is declared to be the harmony of the individual will with this general will (*Econ. Pol.*, p. 172).

But, by a curious and not very consistent psychology, Rousseau admits that "*le peuple veut toujours le bien, mais du lui-même il ne le voit pas toujours*" (*Con. Soc.*, II, 6), while he contends that as each individual wills always the maintenance of his rights, the whole

body of citizens must always will what is for the good of each (*Ibid.*, II, 4). This seems to mean that the will of the whole body—the general will—is a will directed to the general good. For it is in some such way as this that Rousseau (*Ibid.*, IV, 2) gets over the difficulty of a minority losing their liberty by subjection to the wills of a majority. The question for an assembly of the people, he holds, should not be whether they approve or reject a proposal, but whether the proposal is or is not in conformity with the general will.

But, as Haymann points out in the sixth section, this leads in practice to two corollaries which seem contradictory of each other. The one is, that the people, acting as a governing body, is not only *de facto*, but also *de jure*, absolutely sovereign over the individual citizen. The laws, as embodying the general will, cannot possibly be unjust; for it is against nature that any one should injure himself. The other corollary runs in the opposite direction by vindicating the right of rebellion; for it imposes an insuperable limit on the sovereign power—a limit involved in the very nature of the social contract. The right, which this fact confers on the sovereign power, does not pass the limits of public utility; and any act of that power, which passes these limits, becomes by its very nature null and void.

The most interesting section of Haymann's work, therefore, is perhaps the ninth, in which he explains with great fullness the qualifications which Rousseau himself has taken care to impose on those extreme interpretations of his political philosophy, which make him a representative either, on one hand, of a tyrannical socialism and communism, or, on the other hand, of an anarchistic individualism. It is impossible, in a brief review, to notice the numerous details of interest which are brought into prominence here, and which have been too often overlooked in the discussion of Rousseau's teaching. Suffice it to say that Haymann finds the ultimate end of political life, according to Rousseau, not in the maintenance of liberty and equality, but in the enhancement of the power of the state. Rousseau becomes thus for Haymann representative of a reaction against the dominant cosmopolitanism of last century in favor of the patriotic ideal which prevailed among the statesmen and moralists of antiquity. On this narrowing of Rousseau's ethical ideal, also, Haymann founds an important part of the critique in the concluding section of his work. This is regarded as explaining Rousseau's attitude towards Christianity. Rousseau, it is contended, failed to see that the supreme end of moral life must be that humanitarianism which finds its highest expression in Christianity, and which embraces within its scope all patriotic or other

private aims that are of a legitimate nature. This limitation of the moral ideal affords also an explanation of Rousseau's proposal to substitute a civil religion for Christianity, and to enforce this civil religion by penal laws which would have opened the way for all the worst evils of the old persecuting intolerance.

It is perhaps not out of place, even in a philosophical review, to draw attention to an unfortunate external feature of Haymann's book. While it is printed on good paper and in a very readable Roman type, it is disfigured by an extraordinary number of misprints. For these the author is probably not responsible, for they generally are such as should have been corrected by a competent reader before leaving the office of the printer.

JOHN CLARK MURRAY.

McGILL UNIVERSITY.

*Psychology and Life.* By HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, Professor of Psychology in Harvard University. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1899.—pp. xiv, 286.

Three of the six essays contained in this volume ("Psychology and Life," "Psychology and Art," and "Psychology and Mysticism,") appeared a year or two ago in *The Atlantic Monthly*; the paper on "Psychology and Education," was contributed to *The Educational Review*, while that entitled "Psychology and History," was the author's presidential address before the New York meeting of the Psychological Association, and was published last year in *The Psychological Review*. The only part of the book which has not appeared independently in print is the paper which stands second in the volume, and which is entitled "Psychology and Physiology."

The same fundamental idea, often reiterated, runs through all these essays, which, as the author informs us, represent six chapters in a book that was from the first planned as a unity. The preface states very clearly the general purpose of the volume: "The chief aim is the separation of the conceptions of psychology from the conceptions of the real life. Popular ideas about psychology suggest that the psychological description and explanation of mental facts expresses the reality of our inner experience. It is a natural consequence of such a view that our ethical and æsthetical, our practical and educational, our social and historical views are subordinated to the doctrines of psychology. These papers endeavor to show that psychology is not at all an expression of reality, but a complicated transformation of it, worked out for special logical purposes in the service of our life.